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In response, he proposes what he calls a "moral contract"-a reciprocal

agreement of mutual recognition between presently dominant and subordinate groups in the world, such that all people everywhere may legitimately
feel that they are equal participants in the emergence of a "common civilization," that they are reflected in it and reflect it in turn. Within a given society, the moral contract would take the form of an agreement between members of the majority culture and those of minority cultures to treat each

other as equals, and to take seriously the constitutive nature of the other's
culture. To this end, each must be prepared to give up his claim to cultural
purity. Majority members must not predicate full-fledged membership on a
complete abandonment by minority members of their cultural heritage;
rather, they must be prepared to accept them as full members in light of--

indeed, in celebration of-their cultural (or ethnic or religious) difference.
For their part, members of minority cultures must be prepared to adapt, at
least minimally, to the basic rules and values of the majority culture, even if
this means abandoning some of their cultural practices.
It is difficult to try to define the concrete principles according to which a
moral contract to be applied within a given society might be structured.
What constitutes a "minimal" adaptation by members of cultural minorities
to the basic rules and values of the majority culture, for example? How
much can legitimately be required of them? And how much can be required
of members of the majority culture vis- -vis minorities? Even more difficult
is conceptualizing the structure of Maalouf's proposed moral contract between the West and the Rest. What would it look like? And, sadly, what
hope is there for such a contract given current geo-political realities?
Maalouf makes no pretense to even know how to begin to address these
important questions. But this is, ultimately, of little consequence, for the
book's principal merit lies in that it raises these questions-and many others-in the first place, and does so in a way that invites his readers to continue to think hard about the seemingly intractable problem of identitybased violence in the world today. His book is certainly not the place to end
one's inquiry, but it is a useful place to start.
-Sandra J. Badin

A History of Bombing. By Sven Lindqvist. Translated by Linda Haverty Rugg.
New York: The New Press, 2001. Pp. 186. $24.95, cloth.
A History of Bombing is both a straightforward exegesis on the development and growth of aerial bombardment and a well-argued indictment of its
means and mechanisms. Lindqvist's history begins with the invention of the
hot air balloon and the airplane at the turn of the century, and the nearly
immediate recognition by the creators of these machines that they could be
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used as weapons. However, early aerial bombardments were neither terribly
accurate nor tremendously destructive. They could only be utilized effectively against large accumulations of people or structures, and functioned
primarily as a means of spreading panic and terror. The European nations
with the capacity to bomb thus first deployed this weapon in the context
that best exploited its capacity to terrorize: beginning with the first bombs
dropped by Italian fighters near Tripoli on October 26, 1911, European nations bombed their colonies.
The principle thrust of Lindqvist's argument is that the European decision to bomb the indigenous peoples they were attempting to colonize is not
an accident of history. Rather, he situates the advancement of bombing as a
military technique squarely within the greater social context of racial
stratification and ethnic fears that characterized European colonial movements. Native peoples were seen as sub-human and uncivilized-the Italians
originally justified their bombing of civilians by claiming that their mission
of bringing "civilization" to the colonies superceded all other human rights
laws. Throughout his history, Lindqvist weaves in descriptions of contemporary works of literature that invoke such racially violent fantasies: he cites
numerous examples of novels, even before the advent of heavier-than-air
flight, that foretold of a menacing "Yellow peril" and of a world overrun by
hostile Chinese and rescued only by airships that dealt indiscriminate death
across Asia. Lindqvist's narration drips with irony when describing the decision by the World War I belligerents to forbid aerial bombing of each others' forces during the War, at the same time as they continued to bomb civilians in Africa and the Middle East.
Within this context, the turning point in Lindqvists history is not the
infamous decimation of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War, when Europeans first witnessed the terrible destructive power of bombing on their own
continent, but rather a similar raid against Chechaouen in Morocco by the
Spanish more than a decade earlier. It was then that the "taboo" against annihilating a defenseless civilian city from the air was broken and European
war-planners came to fully understand what bombing might do to a civilian
population's capacity to wage war. Lindqvist thus understands the famous
bombings of World War H as the exemplification of an imported tactic; an
outgrowth of the imperialist racial killings that were bombing's spawning

grounds. He points to the American refusal to engage in broad area bombing with the intent of killing or displacing civilians only in Germany. In
Japan, of course, the Air Force perpetrated many of the most terrible civilian
massacres known in the history of warfare, in particular the firebombing of
Tokyo. He locates the causal motive in Americans' deep racial animus toward Japanese and the "Asian other."
Lindqvist's historical explanation begins to break down, however, in his
analysis of the British firebombing of Germany. Prior to World War I, Britain and Germany were economically intertwined, and Chamberlain and the
British saw Hitler and the Germans as equal partners in negotiations. Nev-
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ertheless, it was with little compunction that British bombers set fire to
Hamburg and Dresden, massacring 150,000 people with no objective other
than to kill and derail the German industrial machine. The idea that the
dehumanization of victims, a necessary predicate to civilian bombing, can
arise not from ex ante racial antipathy but simply because they have become
the enemy is nowhere broached. Whereas Lindqvist saw racism as the catalyst for the desire to bomb, in Britain it was the need for bombing that expediently triggered racial dehumanization.

Lindqvist does not see aerial bombing as simply another mechanism for
waging war. Rather, he states as his thesis that bombing is by nature a fundamentally different activity than other types of warfare. Bombing is distinguished by its area-wide effect and usefulness against targets that cannot be
separated from the civilians that surround them; to be used in ways that
violate international human rights norms and slaughter noncombatants is
the bomb's birthright. In the age of destructive bombing and "total war,"
warfare no longer concerns only the leaders or armies that have chosen to
wage it-its ravages are more demonstrably visited upon the women, the
children, the elderly, the unengaged civilians.
The potential use of nuclear weapons marks the apotheosis of this threat.
Nations have constructed enough bombing power to end life on earth hundreds of times over, and so great is the destructive force of these weapons
that even their foremost advocates hardly dare use them. In the last section
of the book, Lindqvist describes the International Court ofJustice's decision
not to impose a legal ban on nuclear weapons and argues persuasively for a
worldwide moratorium on the possession or use of all such weapons.
Though Lindqvist's imagery and the bleak picture he paints of a nuclear
future are compelling, he fails to acknowledge even the small potential that
bombing and nuclear deterrence might hold as a means of ameliorating the
human rights situation worldwide. During his discussion of World War II,
Lindqvist berates the Allied Powers for not having used bombing to end
German concentration camps and suggests even that Britain might have
been able to bargain a cessation of civilian bombing for an end to Nazi
genocide. No such utilitarian possibility is raised in his later discussion of
nuclear weapons. Additionally, despite causing the world to hover over the
edge of a "nuclear abyss" for over fifty years, nuclear weapons are credited by
many historians for having prevented a devastating war between the NATO
and Warsaw powers. Though he does not address the question specifically, it
may be that Lindqvist has already balanced these concerns and decided that
nuclear abolition holds the only possibility for salvation. Having read his
history of the human rights calamities already wrought by bombing, it is
difficult to disagree.
-Jonathan Masur

